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Abstract
This paper studies an economy inhabited by overlapping generations of
homeowners and investors, with the only difference between the two being
that homeowners derive utility from housing services whereas investors do
not. Tight collateral constraint limits the borrowing capacity of homeown-
ers and drives the equilibrium interest rate level down to the housing price
growth rate, which makes housing attractive as a store of value for investors.
As long as the rental market friction is high enough, the investors will hold a
positive number of vacant houses in equilibrium. A housing bubble arises in
an equilibrium in which investors hold houses for resale purposes only and
without the expectation of receiving a dividend either in terms of utility or
rent. The model can be applied to China, where the housing bubble can be
attributed to the rapid decline in the replacement rate of the pension system.
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Housing assets play a dual role. There assets are not only an investment good
but also a consumption good. With the first property alone, housing assets, such
as fiat money, can have a positive value in the overlapping generation model de-
veloped by Samuelson (1958). People are willing to hold housing assets as a store
of value. Housing assets have a rational bubble because their intrinsic value is
zero. However, with the second property alone, housing assets, such as a Lucas
tree, cannot have a rational bubble in Samuelson’s model for the following rea-
son: with a positive population growth rate, the model economy has two stationary
equilibria with an interest rate that is either above or below the population growth
rate.1 In equilibrium, the growth rate of the bubble is equal to the interest rate, and
the size of the bubble cannot grow more rapidly than the economy does. There-
fore, only the lower interest rate is possible in equilibrium. Moreover, positive
dividends (either in terms of rent or in terms of utility) rule out a negative equi-
librium interest rate. Hence, the growth rate of the bubble must be positive and
lower than the population growth rate, which implies that the size of the bubble as
a proportion of the economy approaches zero in the stationary equilibrium.
∗China Center for Economic Research, National School of Development, Peking University,
Beijing 100871, China. (e-mail: bo.robert.zhao@gmail.com). I should thank helpful comments
from seminar participants at Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, University of Queensland, and
the 24th NBER EASE conference. I also thank Li Chao for excellent research assistance. All
errors are my own.
1If the population growth rate is zero, there is only one equilibrium with a positive interest rate.
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My research question is the following: can housing assets have a rational bub-
ble with both properties described above? This paper departs from the two-period
consumption-loan model developed by Samuelson (1958) with only one twist: the
economy consists of two types of households, homeowners and investors, with the
only difference between the two being that homeowners derive utility from hous-
ing services whereas investors do not. With two types of households coexisting in
the model, the equilibrium can have two possible outcomes, which depend on the
degree of collateral constraint.
If the collateral constraint is loose, the model economy ultimately arrives at a
bubbleless equilibrium, in which investors lend to workers at an interest rate that
is higher than the population growth rate. Because the equilibrium interest rate
is higher than the return rate to housing assets (which is equal to the population
growth rate), investors have no incentives to hold the housing assets.
Tight collateral constraint limits the borrowing capacity of homeowners and
drives the equilibrium interest rate level down to the housing price growth rate,
which makes housing attractive as a store of value for investors. There is an
excess supply of funds from the investors and asset shortage because homeowners
are borrowing-constrained at the equilibrium interest rate. In the equilibrium,
investors use the excess funds to purchase houses that are useless to them and
expect that the future young investors will purchase the housing assets from them.
As long as the rental housing market friction is high enough, the rental market
cannot absorb all of the housing assets bought by investors and the investors will
hold some empty houses in the equilibrium. This behavior occurs because high
rental market friction implies a higher rental-price-to-housing-price ratio, which
has homeowners substitute rental housing for owner-occupied housing. However,
investors are always indifferent between leaving houses empty or renting them out
in a bubbly equilibrium. This suggests that the elasticity of rental houses supply is
infinitely elastic and the amount of housing that are rented out in the equilibrium
is completely determined by the demand of homeowners. Therefore, a housing
bubble arises in an equilibrium in which investors hold houses for resale purposes
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only and not with the expectation of receiving a dividend either in terms of utility
or rent.
The main contribution of the paper is the extension of Samuelson (1958) to in-
clude two types of agents with preference heterogeneity and to show that a hous-
ing bubble is possible even if only part of the population derives dividends from
housing assets. The presence of a bubble is robust to the production sector and to
the rental housing market. The sufficient and necessary conditions for the exis-
tence of bubbly equilibrium are tight collateral constraint and high rental market
friction.
The second contribution of the paper is the demonstration that a housing bub-
ble can still exist in a production economy a` la Diamond (1965). Tirole (1985)
uses that framework to study the existence of a bubble in the presence of a Lu-
cas tree that pays a fixed dividend. Tirole shows that a bubble absorbs the excess
savings and helps achieve efficiency as long as the economy would become dy-
namically inefficient if there was no bubble. This paper extends Tirole (1985)
to the study of housing assets, the rent value of which is endogenous and grows
as rapidly as the economy does. In a similar vein, my paper shows that a hous-
ing bubble absorbs the excess savings from investors and removes dynamic effi-
ciency although the sources of dynamic inefficiency are different. The dual role of
housing assets remove the multiplicity of equilibria and the stationary equilibrium
achieved is unique.
There is extensive literature on asset bubbles. My paper is related to ratio-
nal bubbles under symmetric information. (See Brunnermeier (2009) for other
forms of bubbles). In terms of causes of a bubble, recent studies on bubbles fo-
cus on financial friction and credit constraint. Kocherlakota (2009), Miao and
Wang (2011), Farhi and Tirole (2012), and Martin and Ventura (2012) introduce
credit constraint and investor heterogeneity. Bubbles serve as a collateral asset that
helps alleviate the financial constraint of productive firms. Caballero and Krishna-
murthy (2006) and Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2008) argue that speculative
bubbles alleviate the asset scarcity problem in an emerging market and explain
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global imbalance. Instead of focusing on the role of bubbles in alleviating the
borrowing constraint of investment, this paper focuses on the roles of bubbles as
a store of value for household consumption. In other words, previous studies hold
that households purchase bubble assets to borrow (and invest). In my paper, it is
argued that households purchase bubble assets to save(and consume).
The theorectical model of Arce and Lopez-Salido (2011) is the most similar
to that presented in my paper. Arce and Lopez-Salido (2011) introduce hous-
ing assets in a three-period OLG model, in which multiple stationary equilibria
exist depending on the financial constraint. My paper constructs a two-period
overlapping-generation model with two types of agents and production sector. It
shows that multiple equilibria do not necessarily appear in the overlapping gener-
ation model. In some sense, the bubble that arises may show strong stability. Arce
and Lopez-Salido (2011) do not consider the production sector and therefore are
silent about investment and capital accumulation.
In terms of model predictions, the investment-related demand for a store of
value can generate positive co-movement between investment and asset prices.
The consumption-related demand for a store of value usually crowds out savings
and reduces investment. However, my model is able to generate the right correla-
tion based on exogenous shocks to the liquidity supply. In the empirical section, I
apply the model to China, where the housing bubble can be attributed to the rapid
decline in the replacement rate of the pension system.
In terms of welfare implications, all previous studies hold that bubble is Pareto
improving and efficient if it does not burst. In my paper, it is argued that a bubble is
good for investors because it is a good substitute for consumption loans. However,
bubble reduces the welfare of homeowners. Moreover, it raises the borrowing rate
and reduces the amount of housing services consumed.
The structure of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 constructs an
overlapping generation model with exogenous endowment growth to illustrate the
existence of housing bubble. Section 2 discusses the model extension which in-
cludes the rental housing market and production sector. Section 3 considers a
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policy experiment of pension reform that may cause the merge of housing bub-
ble. It uses empirical evidence from China to test the implications of theoretical
model. Concluding remarks are provided in Section 5.
1 Benchmark Model
The benchmark model is a two-period overlapping generation model based on the
consumption-loan model by Samuelson (1958).
1.1 Preference and Endowment
The economy is inhabited by two types of households: investor and homeowner.
Both types live for two periods. The investor has the Cobb-Douglas utility func-
tion
u I
(
ctt , c
t
t+1
)
= ln ctt + β ln ctt+1 (1)
where β > 0. Let ctt and ctt+1 denote the non-durable consumption of households
born at t at time t and t + 1, respectively. The homeowner derives utility not only
from non-durable consumption but also from housing services.
u H
(
ctt , c
t
t+1, h
t
t+1
)
= ln ctt + β (1− ζ ) ln ctt+1 + βζ ln h
t
t+1 (2)
where 0 < ζ < 1. Because of the homothetic preference, both types of households
spend 1/ (1+ β) of their total wealth in the first-period consumption in absence
of borrowing constraint.
Both investors and homeowners receive ytt when young and 0 when old.2 De-
2Section 2 includes the production sector and endogenous wage rate. Since I introduce pay-
as-you-go social security in the model, the old will receive positive pension benefit. Hence, I can
normalize the labor income of the elderly to zero without loss of generality.
6
note the growth rate of output per capita by g. Hence,
yt+1t+1
ytt
= 1+ g (3)
In each period, there are Ntω young homeowners and Nt (1− ω) young investors,
0 < ω < 1. The population growth rate is
Nt+1
Nt
= 1+ n (4)
1.2 Social Security
The government is running a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security plan. It col-
lects τ ytt from each young individual at period t and pays τ (1+ n) ytt to each old
generation, where τ ≥ 0. Hence, the gross return on PAYG system is given by
(1+ g) (1+ n) . There is no government consumption. The government budget
constraint is balanced each period.
1.3 Asset Market
The price of owner-occupied houses in terms of non-durable consumption goods
is given by pt . Housing assets are completely divisible. For simplicity, I assume
away rental market in the benchmark model. It can be considered as the extreme
case where rental market friction is too high. See the extension of the model in
section 2 for the active rental market.
Both homeowners and investors are subject to the same borrowing constraint
att+1 ≥ − (1− θ) pt h
t
t+1 (5)
where housing is the only collateral in this economy. The downpayment ratio θ
satisfies 0 < θ < 1.
The model abstracts from housing construction. It assumes the total stock of
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housing in the economy is Ht , which is a continuous and differentiable function
of pt . Incoporating the housing construction by government or investors will not
affect the qualitative conclusion of the paper.
1.4 Investors’ Problem
The problem of investors born after time t ≥ 1 can be written as
max
ctt ,c
t
t+1,h
t
t+1,a
t
t+1
ln ctt + β ln ctt+1 (6)
subject to the following constraint
ctt + a
t
t+1 + pt h
t
t+1 = (1− τ) y
t
t
ctt+1 = τ (1+ n) y
t+1
t+1 + Rt+1a
t
t+1 + pt+1h
t
t+1
att+1 ≥ − (1− θ) pt h
t
t+1
ctt , c
t
t+1, h
t
t+1 ≥ 0
The solution to the investor’s problem is given in the appendix. We have the
following sufficient conditions for investor’s optimal allocations.
Proposition 1 Given τ , g, n,
{
Rt , pt , ytt
}∞
t=1, the optimal decisions of investors
are the followings:
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1. If Rt+1 = pt+1pt , then
ctt =
1
1+ β
[
1− τ +
τ (1+ n) (1+ g)
Rt+1
]
ytt
ctt+1 =
βRt+1
1+ β
[
1− τ +
τ (1+ n) (1+ g)
Rt+1
]
ytt
att+1 + pt h
t
t+1 = (1− τ ) y
t
t − c
t
t
att+1 > − (1− θ) pt h
t
t+1
htt+1 ≥ 0
2. If Rt+1 > pt+1pt , then
ctt =
1
1+ β
[
1− τ +
τ (1+ n) (1+ g)
Rt+1
]
ytt
ctt+1 =
βRt+1
1+ β
[
1− τ +
τ (1+ n) (1+ g)
Rt+1
]
ytt
att+1 = (1− τ ) y
t
t − c
t
t > 0
htt+1 = 0
3. If Rt+1 < pt+1pt , then
ctt =
1
1+ β
[
1− τ +
τ (1+ n) (1+ g)
γ t+1
]
ytt
ctt+1 =
βγ t+1
1+ β
[
1− τ +
τ (1+ n) (1+ g)
γ t+1
]
ytt
att+1 = − (1− θ) pt h
t
t+1
pt htt+1 =
βγ t+1 (1− τ)− τ (1+ n) (1+ g)
θγ t+1 (1+ β)
ytt
htt+1 > 0
where γ t+1 ≡
pt+1−(1−θ)Rt+1 pt
θ pt
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1.5 Homeowners’ Problem
The problem of homeowners born after time t ≥ 1
max
ctt ,c
t
t+1,h
t
t+1,a
t
t+1
ln ctt + β (1− ζ ) ln ctt+1 + βζ ln h
t
t+1 (7)
subject to the following constraint
ctt + a
t
t+1 = (1− τ) y
t
t − pt htt+1
ctt+1 = τ (1+ n) y
t+1
t+1 + Rt+1a
t
t+1 + pt+1h
t
t+1
att+1 ≥ − (1− θ) pt h
t
t+1
ctt , c
t
t+1, h
t
t+1 ≥ 0
Worker’s problem is solved in the appendix. The optimal decision rules are given
by the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Given τ , g, n,
{
Rt , pt , ytt
}∞
t=1 , the optimal decisions of homeown-
ers are the followings
1. If homeowner is not borrowing constrained, the optimal allocations are
ctt =
1
1+ β
[
1− τ +
τ (1+ n) (1+ g)
Rt+1
]
ytt
ctt+1 =
β (1− ζ ) Rt+1
1+ β
[
1− τ +
τ (1+ n) (1+ g)
Rt+1
]
ytt
pt htt+1 =
1
1− pt+1pt Rt+1
βζ
1+ β
[
1− τ +
τ (1+ n) (1+ g)
Rt+1
]
ytt
att+1 = (1− τ) y
t
t − pt htt+1 − c
t
t
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2. If homeowner is borrowing constrained, the optimal allocations are
ctt =
1
1+ β
[
1− τ +
τ (1+ n) (1+ g)
γ t+1
]
ytt
ctt+1 =
β (1− ζ ) γ t+1
1+ β
[
1− τ +
τ (1+ n) (1+ g)
γ t+1
]
ytt
pt htt+1 =
9t +8t
2θϕ (1+ β)
att+1 = − (1− θ) pt h
t
t+1
where
γ t+1 ≡
λ1
λ2
=
b + 9t+8t2θ(1+β)
β (1− ζ )
(
a − 9t+8t2ϕ(1+β)
)
9t ≡ aϕβ − bθ (1+ βζ )
8t ≡
√
92t + 4abθβζϕ (1+ β)
ϕ ≡
pt+1
pt
− (1− θ) Rt+1
a ≡ (1− τ) ytt
b ≡ τ (1+ n) (1+ g) ytt
1.6 Competitive Equilibrium
Definition 3 Given the financial asset a1,i1 and housing stocks h1,i1 for the initial
old, the distribution of households {µit}∞t=1 with total mass equal to the popula-
tion size, the initial interest rate R1, pension system τ , housing stock {Ht }∞t=1,
the competitive equilibrium consists of the endowment sequence
{
yt,it
}∞
t=1
, prices
{pt , Rt+1}∞t=1, allocations
{
c
t,i
t , c
t,i
t+1, h
t,i
t+1
}∞
t=1
, and the initial consumption c0,i1 ,
i = I, H such that
1. The allocations solve the problem of investors (6) and homeowners (7)
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2. The housing market, financial market, and goods market clear
∫
ht,it+1dµ
i
t = Ht+1∫
a
t,i
t+1dµ
i
t = 0∫
c
t,i
t dµit +
∫
c
t−1,i
t dµit−1 + pt
∫
ht,it+1dµ
i
t =
∫
yt,it dµit + pt
∫
ht−1,it dµit−1
In order to characterize the existence and uniqueness of the stationary equilib-
rium, we first study the properties of optimal decision rules.
Lemma 4 The loan demand (loan supply) of homeowners (investors) is always a
strictly decreasing (increasing) function of interest rate.
Proof. See appendix.
We can detrend the allocations and prices using their growth rate along the
balanced growth path. We can define y˜tt ≡
ytt
(1+g)t , c˜
t
t ≡
ctt
(1+g)t , c˜
t−1
t ≡
ct−1t
(1+n)(1+g)t ,
a˜tt+1 ≡
att+1
(1+g)t , p˜t ≡
pt
(1+n)t (1+g)t , R˜t+1 ≡
Rt+1
(1+n)(1+g) , h˜
t
t+1 ≡ h
t
t+1 (1+ n)
t
,
H˜t+1 ≡ Ht+1, ϕ˜ ≡ ϕ(1+n)(1+g) . Without loss of generality, I assume g = n = 0
from now on. Keep in mind that all the variables are detrended.
Lemma 5 If 0 < ω, θ < 1, there is no stationary equilibrium with gross interest
rate R∗ < 1
Proof. See Appendix.
The Lemma 2 actually states that the dynamic inefficiency, i.e., R∗ < n + g,
can not happen in the equilibrium. The intuition is the following. As long as there
are positive measure of homeowners, the model economy is similar to the Samuel-
son model with Lucas tree, which rules out negative net interest rate. However, it
can not rule out zero net interest rate because of the collateral constraint and the
presence of investors. The following proposition 3 characterizes the difference
cases of stationary equilibria.
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Proposition 6 There exists a unique stationary equilibrium.
1. If θ ≤ θ L , there are unconstrained homeowners and unconstrained in-
vestors holding zero housing assets
2. If θ L < θ ≤ θH , there are borrowing-constrained homeowners and uncon-
strained investors holding zero housing assets
3. If θ > θH , then there are constrained homeowners and unconstrained in-
vestors holding housing assets
where
θ L = ω
and θH is determined by
(1− ω)
(
1− τ −
1
1+ β
)
y − ω
(
1− θH
θH
)
9 +8
2θH (β + 1)
= 0
9 and 8 are defined in proposition 2.
Proof. See Appendix.
Figure 1 shows the stationary equilibrium in three cases. The dotted line is the
loan supply of investors. The minimum equilibrium gross interest rate is 1. The
solid line is the loan demand from homeowners. As proved by Lemma 1, it is a
decreasing function of interest rate. It is kinked because it consists of two parts.
The flatter part is the loan demand of unconstrained homeowners. The steeper
part is the loan demand of borrowing-constrained homeowners. The intersection
point pins down the equilibrium interest rate.
Proposition 7 The third case of stationary equilibrium, i.e., constrained home-
owners and unconstrained investors with empty housing, is a bubbly equilibrium
for investors, but not for homeowners.
Proof. See Appendix.
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Figure 1: Three Cases of Stationary Equilibrium
The fraction of homeowners ω = 0.65, payroll tax τ = 0.2, income per capita
y = 1, discount factor β = 1, and ζ = 0.5 .
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The proposition 4 describes the special feature of the equilibrium with bub-
ble, i.e., it is a bubble from investor’s point of view only. It may seem strange.
However, in order to understand the intuition, let me quote a paragraph from Ti-
role (1985). He described two views of money: the fundamentalist view and the
bubbly view of money. The fundamentalist view argues that “money is held to
finance transactions (or to pay taxes or to satisfy a reserve requirement). To this
purpose, money must be a store of value. However, it is not held for speculative
purposes as there is no bubble on money.” The bubbly view argues that“money is a
pure store value a` la Samuelson (1958). It does not serve any transaction purpose
at least in the long run. This view implies that price of money (bubble) grows at
the real rate of interest, and that money is held entirely for speculation”.“The two
representations are in the long run inconsistent.”
This paper combines the two views together in one model through different
preferences on housing assets. Homeowners derive utility from housing assets.
This is similar to the fundamentalist view. Investors treat housing assets as invest-
ment tools and a store of value. This is same as the bubbly view. Therefore, it
shows that the two representations can be consistent when we study two types of
agents and a special type of asset: housing assets.
2 Model Extension
This section extends the benchmark model to include the rental market and pro-
duction sector. It shows that the qualitative results in the previous section still
hold.
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2.1 Model with Rental Market
In this section, I construct a two-period model with rental market. The investors’
problem can be written as
max
ctt ,c
t
t+1,h
t
t+1,h
R
t+1,a
t
t+1
ln ctt + β ln ctt+1 (8)
subject to the following constraint
ctt + a
t
t+1 + pt h
t
t+1 = (1− τ ) y
t
t + p
r
t h Rt+1
ctt+1 = τ (1+ n) y
t+1
t+1 + Rt+1a
t
t+1 + pt+1h
t
t+1 − δr pt+1h
R
t+1
htt+1 ≥ h
R
t+1
att+1 ≥ − (1− θ) pt h
t
t+1
ctt , c
t
t+1, h
t
t+1, h
R
t+1 ≥ 0
where h Rt+1 denotes the amount of houses that are rent out. δr > 0 denotes the
depreciation rate of rental housing. I will assume frictional rental market in this
paper, in the sense that owner-occupied housing will have a smaller depreciation
rate than rental housing. This can be interpreted as the moral hazard problem of
tenant. I normalize the depreciation rate of owner-occupied housing to zero.
Because of the assumption that investors can not derive utility flow directly
from rental housing, the investors will not rent houses in the model. Since all the
homeowners are homogenous, they will not provide positive rental housing in the
equilibrium. Hence, the homeowners are the demand side of rental market. The
homeowners’ optimization problem becomes
max
ctt ,c
t
t+1,h
r
t+1,h
t
t+1,a
t
t+1
ln ctt + β (1− ζ ) ln ctt+1 + βζ ln
(
hrt+1 + h
t
t+1
) (9)
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subject to the following constraint
ctt + a
t
t+1 = (1− τ) y
t
t − pt htt+1 − p
r
t hrt+1
ctt+1 = τ (1+ n) y
t+1
t+1 + Rt+1a
t
t+1 + pt+1h
t
t+1
att+1 ≥ − (1− θ) pt h
t
t+1
ctt , c
t
t+1, h
t
t+1, h
r
t+1 ≥ 0
where hrt+1 is the amount of housing rent by homeowners. We can similarly define
the competitive equilibrium.
Definition 8 Given the financial asset a1,i1 and housing stocks h1,i1 for the initial
old, the distribution of households {µit}∞t=1 with total mass equals to the popula-
tion size, the initial interest rate R1, pension system τ , housing stock {Ht }∞t=1, the
competitive equilibrium is the sequence of endowment
{
yt,it
}∞
t=1
, prices
{
pt , Rt+1, prt
}∞
t=1,
allocations
{
c
t,i
t , c
t,i
t+1, h
t,i
t+1, h
R,i
t+1, h
r,i
t+1
}∞
t=1
, and the initial consumption c0,i1 ,i =
I, H such that
1. The allocations solve the problem of investors (8) and homeowners (9)
2. The housing market, financial market, rental market, and goods market
clear
∫
ht,it+1dµ
i
t = Ht+1∫
a
t,i
t+1dµ
i
t = 0∫
h R,it+1dµ
i
t =
∫
hr,it+1dµ
i
t∫
c
t,i
t dµit +
∫
c
t−1,i
t dµit−1 + pt
∫
ht,it+1dµ
i
t =
∫
yt,it dµit + pt
∫
ht−1,it dµit−1
The policy functions for the problem of investors (8) and homeowners (9)
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are solved in the Appendix. Here, I only provide some characterizations of the
equilibrium.
Lemma 9 Unconstrained homeowners will not rent houses in the stationary equi-
librium.
Proof. See Appendix.
We are interested in wether the rental market can removes the bubbly station-
ary equilibrium. To simplify the analysis, I assume away pension system, i.e., let
τ = 0.
Proposition 10 If θ > ω and the rental market friction δr is large enough, there
exists a bubble equilibrium after pension reform. More precisely,
1. If δr ≥ θζ , then homeowners will not rent houses and investors will hold
empty houses. There exists a housing bubble for investors.
2. If θζ > δr ≥ ωζ, then homeowners will rent some houses and investors will
still hold some empty houses. There exists a housing bubble for investors.
3. If δr < ωζ, investors will rent all the houses to homeowners and there is no
housing bubble.
Proof. See Appendix.
2.2 Model with Production Sector
The benchmark model can be extended to include the production sector a` la Dia-
mond (1965). Suppose there exists a production sector with production function
written as
Yt = F (Kt , At L t ) (10)
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where the growth rate of labor-augmented technology is given by At+1/At =
1 + g. Suppose F (Kt , At L t) = K αt (At L t)1−α , the profit maximization of the
firm implies that
Rt = 1+ αK α−1t (At L t )
1−α − δ
wt = (1− α) At K αt (At L t)
−α
Now the investors’ problem becomes
max ln ctt + β ln ctt+1 (11)
subject to the following constraint
ctt + a
t
t+1 + pt h
t
t+1 = (1− τ )wt
ctt+1 = τ (1+ n) wt+1 + Rt+1a
t
t+1 + pt+1h
t
t+1
ctt , c
t
t+1, h
t
t+1 ≥ 0
The households’ problem becomes
max ln ct + β (1− ζ ) ln ctt+1 + βζ ln h
t
t+1 (12)
subject to the following constraint
ctt + a
t
t+1 = (1− τ)wt − pt h
t
t+1
ctt+1 = τ (1+ n) wt+1 + Rt+1a
t
t+1 + pt+1h
t
t+1
att+1 ≥ − (1− θ) pt h
t
t+1
ctt , c
t
t+1, h
t
t+1 ≥ 0
We can similarly define the competitive equilibrium.
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Definition 11 Given the financial asset a1,i1 and housing stocks h1,i1 for the initial
old, the distribution of households {µit}∞t=1 with total mass equals to the popula-
tion size, the initial interest rate R1, pension system τ , housing stock {Ht }∞t=1, the
competitive equilibrium consists of prices {pt , Rt+1}∞t=1, allocations
{
c
t,i
t , c
t,i
t+1, h
t,i
t+1, Kt+1
}∞
t=1
,
and the initial consumption c0,i1 ,i = I, H such that
1. The allocations solve the problem of investors (11) and homeowners (12)
2. Firm rent capital and hire labor from households to maximize profit.
3. The housing market, financial market, labor market, and goods market clear
∫
ht,it+1dµ
i
t = Ht+1∫
a
t,i
t+1dµ
i
t = Kt+1
Nt = L t∫
c
t,i
t dµit +
∫
c
t−1,i
t dµit−1 + pt
∫
ht,it+1dµ
i
t + Kt+1 = Yt + pt
∫
ht−1,it dµit−1
Similarly, we can normalize all economic variable by their growth rate along
the balance growth path. Denote y˜tt ≡
ytt
(1+g)t , c˜
t
t ≡
ctt
(1+g)t , c˜
t−1
t ≡
ct−1t
(1+n)(1+g)t ,
a˜tt+1 ≡
att+1
(1+g)t , k˜t+1 ≡
kt+1
(1+g)t (1+n)t , p˜t ≡
pt
(1+n)t (1+g)t , R˜t+1 ≡
Rt+1
(1+n)(1+g) , h˜
t
t+1 ≡
htt+1 (1+ n)
t
, H˜t+1 ≡ Ht+1, ϕ˜ ≡ ϕ(1+n)(1+g)
We are interested in the stationary equilibrium with production sector. To
simplify the analysis, I assume away pension system, i.e., let τ = 0.
Proposition 12 If τ = 0 and the following condition holds, then there exists
housing bubble in the stationary equilibrium.
θ > ω
1
1− α 1+ββ
n+g+1
n+g+δ
Proof. See Appendix.
20
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25
1
1.5
2
2.5
θ<θL=α
Loan Supply / Demand
G
ro
ss
 In
te
re
st
 R
at
e
Figure 2: An Illustration of Pension Reform
The fraction of homeowners ω = 0.65, payroll tax τ = 0.2, downpayment ratio
θ = 0.60, income per capita y = 1, discount factor β = 1, and ζ = 0.5. The
dotted line denotes the loan demand and supply before the pension reform. The
solid line denotes the loan demand and supply after the pension reform.
3 Policy Experiment and Data
3.1 Pension Reform
We now consider a policy experiment. Suppose the government remove the PAYG
system, i.e., τ = 0. The removal of PAYG will always increase the supply of
loan in the economy. It will reduce the borrowing of unconstrained homeowners.
However, for the constrained homeowners, it will increase their loan demand. This
is because the borrowing limit is increased by purchasing more housing assets
using extra money from tax reduction.
Figure 2 is an illustration of pension reform in the endowment economy. The
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Figure 3: Stationary Equilibrium After the Pension Reform in Three Cases
The fraction of homeowners ω = 0.65, payroll tax τ = 0, downpayment ratio
θ = 0.60, 0.66, 0.72, income per capita y = 1,discount factor β = 1, and ζ =
0.5.
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Figure 4: Transitional Dynamics after the Pension Reform
Model period equals 30 years. The fraction of homeowners ω = 0.33, payroll
tax decreases to zero from τ = 0.40 after the reform, the downpayment ratio
θ = 0.70, discount factor β = 1, and ζ = 0.5, the annual population growth rate
is 2 percent and the productivity growth rate is 5 percent.
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dotted line denotes the demand and supply of loans before the pension reform. The
solid line denotes the loan demand and supply after the pension reform. Whether
the new equilibrium interest rate will be pushed down towards zero depends on
the tightness of collateral constraint. If the borrowing constraint is tight enough,
the increase in the loan supply will surpasses the increasing loan demand from
constrained homeowners. Therefore, bubble is possible.
Proposition 13 In the endowment economy, suppose the government remove the
PAYG system. Bubble will arise if and only if θ > ω. A sufficient condition for
housing wealth/GDP ratio to be higher than the pre-reform era is τ > θ−ω1−ω .
Proof. See Appendix.
Figure 4 exhibits the policy experiments in all three cases, i.e., θ < θ L , θ L <
θ < θH , and θ > θH . According to the Proposition 5, only pension reform in
case 2 and case 3 can trigger housing bubble.
In the production economy, the removal of pension system can trigger a tran-
sitional dynamics characterized by the following proposition.
Proposition 14 In the production economy, suppose the government remove the
PAYG system and there exists a housing bubble in the new stationary equilibrium,
then housing price and interest rate converge monotonically to the unique new
steady state.
Proof. See Appendix.
During the transition, the housing price growth rate is equal to the gross inter-
est rate. The normalized interest rate is defined as the gross interest rate divided
by the gross population growth rate and productivity growth rate. The normalized
housing price growth rate is the housing price sequence divided by the current
population and productivity. The investment is normalized in the similar way.
The normalized wage rate is defined as the wage rate divided by the current pro-
ductivity.
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3.2 Data
Housing price in China has been increasing strongly over the past decade. The
connected solid line in Figure 5 shows that the real land-selling price for the whole
country increases at an annual rate 15.7 percent from 2000 to 2009. There is no
constant quality official housing price index for China. I also draw the official
average commodity building selling price for 35 large cities in China. It shows a
slower annual growth rate, 7 percent, from year 2000 to 2009. Wu, Gyourko and
Deng (2012) also construct constant quality price index for newly-built private
housing in 35 major Chinese cities. According to their estimate, the annual price
growth is nearly 10 percent from year 2000 to 2009. In the meantime, the US has
already experienced a burst in housing bubble in 2008.
The unprecedented housing boom in China encourage large increase real es-
tate investment and the boom in the home ownerships. As shown by Figure 6, the
share of real estate investment in total fixed investment increases from 13 percent
at 1999 to 20 percent at 2010. The urban households home ownerships rate esti-
mated from Urban Households Survey shows that China’s home ownership rate is
nearly 90 percent in 2010, among the highest in the world.3 These two facts im-
plies a lot of households own more than one apartment. Popular wisdoms claim
that there is a housing bubble in China. One feature of the housing bubble is the
high vacancy rate in China. A vacant house/apartment is a unit that has been built
but is not occupied by anybody. The vacancy rate is defined as all vacant units/all
3The urban home ownership rate increases from less than 30 percent to 70 percent during
1994-1999, a period when the housing reform takes place. Before the housing reform, it is the
state-owned enterprises (SOE) that are responsible for providing employee housing to workers,
with a little or no charge for rents. The government liberalizes the housing market in 1994 by
selling the public housing to the current employee in state-owned enterprises at heavily subsidized
price. Newly employed workers in SOE and workers in the private sectors have to purchase houses
that are provided by private real estate developers. The transition into the new housing system ends
around 1999, after which no SOE are allowed to provide employee housing to their workers. At
the end of year 2010, the home ownership rate of urban households in China is 89.3 percent, which
is among the highest in the world. 40.1 percent of them own privatized houses which previously
are owned by the government or state-owned enterprises. 38 percent of households have bought
houses that are provided at a market price.
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Figure 5: Housing Price and Land Price: China and the US
The US Housing price index is from S&P/Case-Shiller 10-MSA Index. The land
selling price is computed by author using data from China Satistics Year Book.
The land price is defined as total value of land purchased divided by total land
space purchased. The commodity building sell prices is based on the 35-city av-
erage selling price series from National Bureau of Statistics. All series are in log
real value deflated by CPI (Urban CPI for Chinese data) and normalized to the
same level at year 1996.
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Figure 6: Urban Residential Investment and Homeownership Rate
The share of urban residential investment is defined as the real estate development
(including land purchase) divided by the total investment in fixed assets in the
whole country. Homeownership rate is from China urban households survey.
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housing units (occupied + vacant). In the US, the gross vacancy rate is The gross
vacancy rates are 12.7, 13.0, 13.8, 14.4, 14.5, 14.3 during 2005-2010. In China,
according to the China Family Panel Studies 2011, 22 percent of urban house-
holds own more than one apartment. Only 25 percent of these rich households
rent their apartments out. The vacancy rate in year 2010 is 11 percent according
to author’s estimate.
According to this paper, the insufficient social security for causing the sky-
rocketing housing prices because the elderly choose to own empty houses as a
store of value to finance their later-life consumption. Figure 7 plots the pension re-
placement rate and contribution rate in China. The pension reform starts in China
from 1999, which changes the traditional pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system into a
mixture of PAYG system and fully-funded system. From then on, the replacement
rate of pension system decreases from around 75 percent to only 45 percent in
2009. During the same period, the saving rate in China increases by 15 percent,
which suggest that Chinese households increase savings partly to compensate the
huge decline in the pension payment.
What if those households just invest their pension in terms of stocks and other
investment tools? Because the poor development in the financial market, the aver-
age return on the stock market over the past twenty years in very low (the average
real return on shanghai stock market index is only 2 percent from year 2000 to
2009) and median households can only access to risk-free bond which delivers
almost zero interest actually. Therefore, the missing social security is accompa-
nied by the dynamic inefficiency in China. Figure 8 shows that the real interest
rate is China is much lower than the real growth rate, which makes risk-free bond
unattractive relative to housing investment for households.
Although there is studies documenting that the capital return in China is very
high, however, those projects are not accessible to normal households in China.
In fact, Chinese government itself has accumulated great amount of foreign as-
sets and implicitly issue collateralized bonds to Chinese citizens. The low return
of government bonds reflects the huge demand for assets or investment tools in
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Figure 7: Social Security Replacement Rate and Contribution Rate
Data are from China Statistics Year Books 1990-2010. Replacement Rate is de-
fined as the total pension benefit payment per urban retiree covered in the pension
system divided by the average urban wage rate. The contribution rate is the to-
tal contribution per urban worker covered in the pension system divided by the
average urban wage rate.
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Figure 8: Dynamic Inefficiency
The real interest rate is the benchmark interest rate set by the central bank for
one-year fixed-term deposit deflated by CPI. The Real GNP annual growth rate is
also deflated by CPI.
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China. There are many reasons for causing the dynamic inefficiency problem,
e.g., the poor financial development, the absence of social security system, etc. If
the capital account were fully open, Chinese households would have purchased
huge amount of assets abroad directly. This dynamic inefficiency creates excess
supply of liquidity which allows for speculative bubble.
3.3 Test of the Model
The Chinese pension system is mainly operating at city or province level. Each
city or province has their own pension replacement standard and is running a
segmented pension fund account. Therefore, we can exploit the regional variation
in pension system to identify its effect on regional housing prices. If the theory
is correct, we would observe larger housing price appreciation for the province
where the pension contribution rate declines most. I first compute the theoretical
contribute rate τ i,t , which is the tax rate that make the budget constraint of pay-
as-you-go pension system holds for each province i at year t .
τ i,t =
expenditurei,t
workeri,t × wagei,t
, i = 1, . . . , 35, t = 2001, . . . , 2011
where expenditurei,t the total expenditure of pension fund at province i and year
t . workeri,t is the number of workered covered by the pension fund and wagei,t is
the average wage rate of workers.
Figure 9 plots the changes in housing prices across 35 cities against the changes
in the theoretical contribution rates over year 2001-2011. There is a clear negative
correlation which confirms the prediction of the theory. The simple OLS univari-
ate regression has a coefficient -2.84, which is significant at 1 percent confidence
level. The R squared is .24.
In order to estimate the effect of theoretical contribution rate on housing price
carefully, I estimate the following regression. However, the actual pension contri-
bution is usually higher than the theoretical contribution rate. I define the wealth
effect as the difference between the theoretical contribution rate minus the ac-
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Figure 9: Cross-section 10-year Changes in the Housing prices and Changes in
the Theoretical Contribution Rate 2001-2011
The commodity building sell prices is based on the 35-city average selling price
series from National Bureau of Statistics. All series are in log real value deflated
by CPI (Urban CPI for Chinese data). Most 35 cities are the capital cities. Since
the pension system is mainly operating at provincial level, I merge the capital
city with their province and compute theoretical contribution rate using provincial
data. The size of dot represents the size of the population in that province.
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Table 1: Regression Result on the Effect of Theoretical Contribution Rate on
Housing Prices
Depend Var. log(housing price) Pooled regression Random Effect Fixed Effect
log(gdp) .0335 .157 ∗∗∗ .0335
(0.29) (3.61) (0.35)
Theoretical Contribution Rate -1.91∗∗∗ -1.88∗∗∗ -1.49∗∗∗
(-3.41) (-5.39) (-4.04)
Wealth Effect 1.42∗∗∗ 1.58∗∗∗ 1.42∗∗∗
(3.11) (4.12) (3.69)
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes
Province Dummies Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.92 .68 .60
No. of Obs. 385 385 385
tual contribution rate. This measures the other channel which pension reform can
affect the households behavior and housing price.
ln
(
Pi,t
)
= αZ i,t + βτ i,t + γwealth effecti,t
where Z i,t include the city dummies, year dummies and the log
(
gdpi,t
)
for province
i at year t .
The result of regression is given by Table 1. The coefficient before the the-
oretical contribution rate is smaller than the slope in Figure 9. For example, the
fixed effect estimates shows that a 10 percentage points decline in the theoretical
contribution rate contributed to a 14.2 percent increase in real housing price level.
4 Conclusion
This paper studies an economy inhabited by overlapping generations of homeown-
ers and investors, with the only difference between the two being that homeowners
derive utility from housing services whereas investors do not. Tight collateral con-
straint limits the borrowing capacity of homeowners and drives the equilibrium
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interest rate level down to the housing price growth rate, which makes housing
attractive as a store of value for investors. As long as the rental market friction is
high enough, the investors will hold a positive number of vacant houses in equi-
librium. A housing bubble arises in an equilibrium in which investors hold houses
for resale purposes only and without the expectation of receiving a dividend either
in terms of utility or rent. The model can be applied to China, where the housing
bubble can be attributed to the rapid decline in the replacement rate of the pension
system.
This paper also shed some lights on the issue of government debt. If the gov-
ernment lend to much if the borrowing constraint is high, it will only drive the
interest too low and investors will start to accumulate too much bubble asset. The
Chinese government has issued a rescue package after the financial crisis in the
US 2008, which triggered a further wave of housing price boom in China.
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A Mathematical Appendix
A.1 Benchmark Model
A.1.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The Lagrangian function is
L = ln ctt + β ln ctt+1
+λ1
[
(1− τ) ytt − c
t
t − a
t
t+1 − pt h
t
t+1
]
+λ2
[
τ (1+ n) yt+1t+1 + Rt+1a
t
t+1 + pt+1h
t
t+1 − c
t
t+1
]
+µ1
[
att+1 + (1− θ) pt h
t
t+1
]
+ν1htt+1
The FOCs become
ctt :
1
ctt
− λ1 = 0
ctt+1 :
β
ctt+1
− λ2 = 0
att+1 : −λ1 + λ2 Rt+1 + µ1 = 0
htt+1 : −λ1 pt + λ2 pt+1 + µ1 (1− θ) pt + ν1 = 0
where
µ1 ≥ 0, if att+1 + (1− θ) pt h
t
t+1 > 0, then µ1 = 0
ν1 ≥ 0, if htt+1 > 0, then ν1 = 0
The life-time budget constraint for the investors is
ctt +
ctt+1
Rt+1
= (1− τ) ytt +
τ (1+ n) yt+1t+1
Rt+1
+
(
pt+1
Rt+1
− pt
)
htt+1
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1. att+1 + (1− θ) pt h
t
t+1 > 0, i.e., the borrowing constraint of the investors is
not binding; htt+1 > 0,i.e., the unconstrained investors hold positive amount
of housing. Therefore µ1 = ν1 = 0. Plug them into the FOCs
−λ1 + λ2 Rt+1 = 0
−λ1 pt + λ2 pt+1 = 0
The following equality holds
Rt+1 =
pt+1
pt
and the optimal consumption rules are
ctt =
1
1+ β
[
1− τ +
τ (1+ n) (1+ g)
Rt+1
]
ytt
ctt+1 =
βRt+1
1+ β
[
1− τ +
τ (1+ n) (1+ g)
Rt+1
]
ytt
The allocation between the private IOUs and housing assets are indetermi-
nate. The total saving is determined by
att+1 + pt h
t
t+1 = (1− τ t ) y
t
t − c
t
t
2. att+1 + (1− θ) pt h
t
t+1 > 0, i.e., the borrowing constraint of investor is
not binding; htt+1 = 0, i.e., the investor holds zero amount of housing.
Therefore, µ1 = 0, ν1 ≥ 0. Plug them into the FOCs,
−λ1 + λ2 Rt+1 = 0
−λ1 pt + λ2 pt+1 + ν1 = 0
Hence,
Rt+1 ≥
pt+1
pt
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(a) If ν1 = 0, then we go back to case 1
(b) If ν1 > 0, then Rt+1 > pt+1pt . The purchase of housing are less attrac-
tive than the lending to the others.
att+1 = (1− τ) y
t
t − c
t
t
htt+1 = 0
3. att+1 + (1− θ) pt h
t
t+1 = 0, i.e., the borrowing constraint of the investors is
binding; htt+1 > 0, i.e., the constrained investors hold positive amount of
housing. Therefore, µ1 ≥ 0, ν1 = 0.
(a) If µ1 = v1 = 0, we go back to case 1. If µ1 > 0, ν1 = 0, then
λ1
λ2
> Rt+1
λ1
λ2
>
pt+1
pt
λ1
λ2
=
pt+1 − (1− θ) Rt+1 pt
θ pt
Suppose pt+1pt < Rt+1 <
λ1
λ2
, then Rt+1 < λ1λ2 =
pt+1−(1−θ)Rt+1 pt
θ pt <
pt+1−(1−θ)pt+1
θ pt =
pt+1
pt ,a contradiction! Therefore,
Rt+1 <
pt+1
pt
<
λ1
λ2
=
pt+1 − (1− θ) Rt+1 pt
θ pt
Let γ t ≡
λ1
λ2
=
pt+1−(1−θ)Rt+1 pt
θ pt . Rewrite the budget constraints as
ctt = (1− τ) y
t
t − θ pt htt+1
ctt+1 = τ (1+ n) (1+ g) y
t
t + θγ t pt htt+1
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Solve for pt htt+1
pt htt+1 =
βγ t (1− τ)− τ (1+ n) (1+ g)
θγ t (1+ β)
ytt
Therefore
ctt =
1
1+ β
[
1− τ +
(1+ n) (1+ g)
γ t
]
ytt
ctt+1 =
βγ t
1+ β
[
1− τ +
(1+ n) (1+ g)
γ t
]
ytt
att+1 = − (1− θ) pt h
t
t+1
pt htt+1 =
βγ t (1− τ)− τ (1+ n) (1+ g)
θγ t (1+ β)
ytt
4. att+1 + (1− θ) pt h
t
t+1 = 0,i.e., the borrowing constraint of the investors is
binding; htt+1 = 0,i.e., the investors hold positive amount of housing
ctt = (1− τ) y
t
t
ctt+1 = τ (1+ n) (1+ g) y
t
t
Then µ1, v1 ≥ 0.
−λ1 + λ2 Rt+1 + µ1 = 0
−λ1 pt + λ2 pt+1 + µ1 (1− θ) pt + ν1 = 0
(a) If µ1, ν1 > 0, either investors have too little endowment when they
are young and do not want to save
λ1
λ2
>
pt+1 − Rt+1 (1− θ) pt
θ pt
>
pt+1
pt
> Rt+1
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or investors’ borrowing cost is too large
λ1
λ2
> Rt+1 >
pt+1
pt
>
pt+1 − Rt+1 (1− θ) pt
θ pt
In this article, I assume the young has enough endowment and wants
to save. Therefore, I rule out the case λ1
λ2
>
pt+1−Rt+1(1−θ)pt
θ pt >
pt+1
pt >
Rt+1.
(b) If µ1 > 0, v1 = 0, We go back to Case 3
(c) If µ1 = 0, ν1 > 0, We go back to Case 2
(d) If µ1 = 0, v1 = 0, We go back to Case 1
A.1.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The Lagrangian function is
L = ln ctt + βζ ln
(
htt+1
)
+ β (1− ζ ) ln ctt+1
+λ1
[
(1− τ) yt − pt htt+1 − c
t
t − a
t
t+1
]
+λ2
[
τ (1+ n) (1+ g) yt + Rt+1att+1 + pt+1h
t
t+1 − c
t
t+1
]
+µ1
[
att+1 + (1− θ) pt h
t
t+1
]
The FOCs become
ctt :
1
ctt
− λ1 = 0
ctt+1 :
β (1− ζ )
ctt+1
− λ2 = 0
att+1 : −λ1 + λ2 Rt+1 + µ1 = 0
htt+1 :
βζ
htt+1
− λ1 pt + λ2 pt+1 + µ1 (1− θ) pt = 0
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where
µ1 ≥ 0, if att+1 + (1− θ) pt h
t
t+1 > 0, then µ1 = 0
and the life-time budget constraint is given by
ctt +
ctt+1
Rt+1
+
(
pt −
pt+1
Rt+1
)
htt+1 = (1− τ) y
t
t +
τ (1+ n) yt+1t+1
Rt+1
1. att+1+(1− θ) pt h
t
t+1 > 0, i.e., the borrowing constraint of the homeowners
is not binding. Therefore, µ1 = 0. Hence,
λ1
λ2
= Rt+1 =
pt+1 + ζ1−ζ
ctt+1
htt+1
pt
The optimal decision rules are
ctt =
1
1+ β
[
1− τ +
τ (1+ n) (1+ g)
Rt+1
]
ytt
ctt+1 =
β (1− ζ ) Rt+1
1+ β
[
1− τ +
τ (1+ n) (1+ g)
Rt+1
]
ytt
pt htt+1 =
1
1− pt+1pt Rt+1
βζ
1+ β
[
1− τ +
τ (1+ n) (1+ g)
Rt+1
]
ytt
att+1 = (1− τ) y
t
t − pt htt+1 − c
t
t
2. att+1+(1− θ) pt h
t
t+1 = 0, i.e., the borrowing constraint of the homeowners
is binding. Therefore, µ1 ≥ 0
(a) If µ1 = 0, then we go back to Case 1.
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(b) If µ1 > 0
−λ1 + λ2 Rt+1 + µ1 = 0
βζ
htt+1
− λ1 pt + λ2 pt+1 + µ1 (1− θ) pt = 0
Hence, the condition for Rt+1 is given by
Rt+1 <
λ1
λ2
Let λ1λ2 ≡ γ t , then from the budget constraint
ctt = (1− τ) y
t
t − θ pt htt+1
and
ctt+1 = τ (1+ n) (1+ g) y
t
t + (pt+1 − Rt+1 (1− θ) pt ) htt+1
From the FOC w.r.t. htt+1, we have
βζ
htt+1
− λ1θ pt + λ2 (pt+1 − Rt+1 (1− θ) pt ) = 0
Use the expression for λ1, λ2, we have
1 = λ1 (1− τ) ytt − λ1θ pt htt+1
β (1− ζ ) = λ2τ (1+ n) (1+ g) ytt + λ2 (pt+1 − Rt+1 (1− θ) pt ) htt+1
βζ = λ1θ pt htt+1 − λ2 (pt+1 − Rt+1 (1− θ) pt ) h
t
t+1
Therefore
1+ β = λ1 (1− τ) ytt + λ2τ (1+ n) (1+ g) y
t
t
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Note that
1+ β =
(1− τ) ytt
(1− τ) ytt − θ pt htt+1
+β (1− ζ )
τ (1+ n) (1+ g) ytt
τ (1+ n) (1+ g) ytt + (pt+1 − Rt+1 (1− θ) pt ) htt+1
This is a quadratic equation for pt htt+1. Let
x = pt htt+1
ϕ =
pt+1
pt
− (1− θ) Rt+1
a = (1− τ) ytt
b = τ (1+ n) (1+ g) ytt
Then
1+ β =
a
a − θx
+
β (1− ζ ) b
b + ϕx
It has a unique positive solution
pt htt+1 = x =
9t +8t
2θϕ (1+ β)
where 9t = aϕβ − bθ (1+ βζ ) ,8t =
√
92t + 4abθβζϕ (β + 1).
We can define γ t
γ t =
λ1
λ2
=
ctt+1
β (1− ζ ) ctt
=
b + ϕx
β (1− ζ ) (a − θx)
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and
ctt =
1
1+ β
[
1− τ +
τ (1+ n) (1+ g)
γ t
]
ytt
ctt+1 =
β (1− ζ ) γ t
1+ β
[
1− τ +
τ (1+ n) (1+ g)
γ t
]
ytt
pt htt+1 =
βγ t (1− τ)− τ (1+ n) (1+ g)
θγ t (1+ β)
ytt
A.1.3 Proof of Lemma 1
We start first by looking the saving function of the unconstrained homeowner/investor.
It is obvious to see the saving function of the unconstrained homeowner/investor is
a decreasing function of interest rate. When the investor is borrowing constrained,
higher interest rate reduces γ t and implies fewer housing bought. Hence, the
amount investor can borrowing is a decreasing function of interest rate. When the
homeowner is borrowing constrained, the loan demand function becomes compli-
cated. Differentiate pt htt+1 directly w.r.t. ϕ
pt htt+1 =
9t +
√
92t + 4abβζθϕ (β + 1)
2θϕ (β + 1)
=
4abβζθϕ (β + 1)
2θϕ (β + 1)
(√
92t + 4abβζθϕ (β + 1)−9t
)
= 2abβζ 1√
92t + 4abβζθϕ (β + 1)−9t
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Then
∂pt htt+1
∂ϕ
= −2abβζ

 1√
92t + 4abβζθϕ (β + 1)−9t


2
×
(
d
dϕ
√
92t + 4abβζθϕ (β + 1)−
d
dϕ
9t
)
Note that 9t = aϕβ − bθ (1+ βζ)
d
dϕ
9t = aβ
and also
d
dϕ
√
92t + 4abθβζϕ (β + 1)
=
aβ9t + 2abβζθ (β + 1)√
92t + 4abβζθϕ (β + 1)
= aβ
(aϕβ − bθ (1+ βζ))+ 2bζθ (β + 1)√
92t + 4abβζθϕ (β + 1)
< aβ
because
((aϕβ − bθ (1+ βζ ))+ 2bζ θ (β + 1))2 −
(
92t + 4abβζθϕ (β + 1)
)
= −4b2ζ θ2 (β + 1) (1− ζ ) < 0
Therefore,
∂pthtt+1
∂ϕ
> 0,
∂pt htt+1
∂R
< 0
The loan demand of constrained homeowner is an increasing function of interest
rate.
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A.1.4 Proof of Lemma 2
The stationary equilibrium is defined as the competitive general equilibrium in
which all individual allocations and prices are time invariant. We need to fur-
ther assume that Ht = H¯ in the stationary equilibrium to get constant housing
price. Denote the constant housing price by p∗. Obviously we have p∗ > 0.
Otherwise, workers would purchase infinite amount of houses. Suppose the equi-
librium gross interest R∗ < 1. The gross return of housing for the investors is 1,
which is higher than the gross return R∗ on consumption loans. From the previ-
ous decision rules, the borrowing constraint for both types of households would
be binding. The total borrowing of workers is positive and the total borrowing of
investors is non-negative. Therefore, the market for loans can not clear at R∗ < 1.
Equilibrium interest rate has to be higher and R∗ < 1 cannot be a equilibrium
interest rate. Note that if θ = 1, both investors and households can not borrow in
the equilibrium. Any R∗ < 1 can be the equilibrium interest rate.
A.1.5 Proof of Proposition 3
The optimal demand and supply of loans are continuous. Lemma 1 proves that
the demand of loans from homeowners is monotonically decreasing in the interest
rate and the supply of loans from investors is a monotonically increasing function
of interest rate. From Lemma 2, there exists a unique stationary equilibrium with
R∗ ≥ 1.
Investors will not be borrowing constrained when R∗ ≥ 1. They supply loans
in the market. θ will only affect the optimal decision of homeowners, who are the
demand side of loan market. High θ reduces the borrowing limit of constrained
homeowners. If θ is high enough, the total borrowing from homeowners become
less than the total loan supply from investors. Net interest has to be lower in order
to clear the consumption loan market. When the net interest rate drops to zero,
investors would then invest extra cash in the housing market. Therefore, there
are two threshold levels for collateral constraint, denoted by θ L and θH and three
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different cases which we analyze one by one.
1. Unconstrained homeowners and unconstrained investors without housing.
In the stationary equilibrium, ytt = y, Ht = H. The equilibrium prices(
p∗1, R
∗
1
)
are determined by
H = ω
1
p1
R1
R1 − 1
βζ
1+ β
(
1− τ +
τ
R1
)
y
0 = 1− τ −
1
1+ β
(
1− τ +
τ
R1
)(
1+ ω
βζ R1
R1 − 1
)
The second equation determines a unique R∗1 > 1.4 Hence, housing price
can be determined by
p∗1 = ω
y
H
R∗1
R∗1 − 1
βζ
1+ β
(
1− τ +
τ
R∗1
)
Note that θ can not affect either p∗1 or R
∗
1 . Now we can solve for the first
threshold θ L when homeowners is borrowing constrained
(1− τ)−
1
1+ β
(
1− τ +
τ
R∗1
)
= θ L
R∗1
R∗1 − 1
βζ
1+ β
(
1− τ +
τ
R∗1
)
Using the loan market clearing condition, we have θ L = ω. Therefore
∂θ L
∂ω = 1. The intuition is that more homeowners will increase the equilib-
rium interest rate. When the interest rate becomes higher, homeowners will
reduce the consumption and housing expenditure. They will be borrowing
constrained under a stricter borrowing constraint.
2. Constrained homeowners and unconstrained investors without housing. The
4The other solution R < 1 cannot be an equilibrium interest rate.
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equilibrium prices
(
p∗2, R
∗
2
)
are determined by
ω
1
p2
9 +8
2θϕ (β + 1)
= H
(1− ω)
[
1− τ −
1
1+ β
(
1− τ +
τ
R2
)]
y − ω (1− θ)
9 +8
2θϕ (β + 1)
= 0
The two equations imply two implicit functions p∗2
(
R∗2 , θ
)
and R∗2 (θ) . The
effect of θ on equilibrium housing price is given by
dp∗2
(
R∗2 , θ
)
dθ
=
∂p∗2
(
R∗2 , θ
)
∂R∗2
d R∗2
dθ
+
∂p∗2
(
R∗2 , θ
)
∂θ
On one hand, tighter credit constraint reduces the housing demand, which
tends to reduce the price. However, tighter credit constraint also reduces
interest rate, which in turns encourages housing consumption. Hence, the
total effect is indeterminate.
3. Constrained homeowners and unconstrained investors with empty housing.
When R∗3 =
pt+1
pt = 1, The market clearing conditions become
ω
1
p3
9 +8
2θϕ (β + 1)
+ (1− ω)
I
p3
= H
(1− ω)
[
(1− τ) y −
1
1+ β
y − I
]
− ω (1− θ)
9 +8
2θϕ (β + 1)
= 0
where I denotes the investor’s purchase of housing assets. Combine the two
conditions and note that ϕ = θ when R = 1.
(1− ω)
(
1− τ −
1
1+ β
)
y + ω
9 +8
2θ (β + 1)
= p3 H
which suggests that p∗3 is independent of θ since (9 +8) /θ does not de-
pend on θ. The total amount of savings is invested in housing assets. The
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threshold θH for investors to hold housing assets is determined by
(1− ω)
(
1− τ −
1
1+ β
)
y − ω
(
1− θH
θH
)
9 +8
2θH (β + 1)
= 0
It is also true that ∂θH∂ω > 0. This is because highω implies fewer loan supply
from investors. The collateral constraint has to be higher to clear the loan
market.
A.1.6 Proof of Proposition 4
Suppose there is a useless asset called paper. In case 3, it has positive value in
the equilibrium. This is because investor has excess supply of loan in the market,
which can be invested in the paper. Since the equilibrium interest rate is 1, the
price of paper remains constant in the equilibrium. The size of the paper bubble
is given by
B = (1− ω)
(
1− τ −
1
1+ β
)
y − ω
(
1− θ
θ
)
9 +8
2θ (β + 1)
> 0 for θ > θH
This is called pure bubble. However, the bubble can also take the form of housing
assets. If the investors purchase the housing assets I instead, then
B = (1− ω) I
which means bubble can shift from paper market to the housing market. If we de-
fine the bubble as the case in which investors hold houses for resale purposes only
and not with the expectation of receiving a dividend either in terms of utility or
rent, then the case 3 satisfies this definition because we rule out the rental market.
The next question is whether there is bubble for homeowners? The answer is no.
First of all, we define the fundamental value of housing assets to homeowners,
and then we show that under properly adjusted interest rate, the housing price is
equal to its fundamental value for homeowners in all three cases.
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1. Unconstrained homeowners and unconstrained investors without housing.
The fundamental value of housing is defined as
pFt =
pt+1 + ζ1−ζ
ctt+1
htt+1
Rt+1
=
∞∑
τ=0
1
Rt+1..Rt+τ
ζ
1− ζ
ct+τt+τ+1
ht+τt+τ+1
+ lim
T→∞
pt+T
1
Rt+1..Rt+T−1
Using the first order condition of homeowners
pFt =
∞∑
τ=0
1
Rt+1..Rt+τ
(pt+τ Rt+τ − pt+τ+1)+ lim
T→∞
pt+T
1
Rt+1..Rt+T−1
In the stationary equilibrium, R∗1 > 1, limT→∞ p∗1
1
(R∗1)
T = 0
pF =
∞∑
τ=0
1(
R∗1
)τ+1
(
p∗1 R
∗
1 − p
∗
1
)
= p∗1
∞∑
τ=0
R∗1 − 1(
R∗1
)τ+1 = p∗1
2. Constrained homeowners and unconstrained investors without housing. The
fundamental value of housing can be defined as
pFt =
pt+1 + ζ1−ζ
ctt+1
htt+1
Rˆt
=
∞∑
τ=0
1
Rˆt ..Rˆt+τ
ζ
1− ζ
ct+τt+τ+1
ht+τt+τ+1
+ lim
T→∞
pt+T
1
Rˆt ..Rˆt+T−1
where Rˆt = θ λ1λ2 + (1− θ) Rt+1. This measures the effective interest rate
that households face. It takes into account the shadow value of borrowing
constraint. If the borrowing constraint is not binding, λ1/λ2 = Rt+1 = Rˆt .
If the borrowing constraint is binding, the effect interest rate is a weighted
average of λ1/λ2 and Rt+1. Therefore, Rt+1 < Rˆt < λ1/λ2. Using the first
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order condition of constrained homeowners
pFt =
∞∑
τ=0
1
Rˆt ..Rˆt+τ
λ1 pt − λ2 pt+1 − µ1 (1− θ) pt
λ2
+ lim
T→∞
pt+T
1
Rˆt ..Rˆt+T−1
In the stationary equilibrium, Rˆ∗2 = θ
λ1
λ2
+(1− θ) R∗2 > 1, limT→∞ p
∗
2
1(
Rˆ∗2
)T =
0
pF =
∞∑
τ=0
1(
Rˆ∗2
)τ+1 λ1 p
∗
2 − λ2 p
∗
2 −
(
λ1 − λ2 R∗2
)
(1− θ) p∗2
λ2
= p∗2
∞∑
τ=0
1(
Rˆ∗2
)τ+1
(
λ1
λ2
θ + R∗2 (1− θ)− 1
)
= p∗2
∞∑
τ=0
Rˆ∗2 − 1(
Rˆ∗2
)τ+1 = p∗2
3. Constrained homeowners and unconstrained investors with empty housing.
The fundamental value of housing can be defined as
pFt =
pt+1 + ζ1−ζ
ctt+1
htt+1
Rˆt
=
∞∑
τ=0
1
Rˆt ..Rˆt+τ
ζ
1− ζ
ct+τt+τ+1
ht+τt+τ+1
+ lim
T→∞
pt+T
1
Rˆt ..Rˆt+T−1
where Rˆ3 = θ λ1λ2 + 1− θ. Using the first order condition of homeowners,
pFt =
∞∑
τ=0
1
Rˆt ..Rˆt+τ
λ1 pt − λ2 pt+1 − (λ1 − λ2 Rt+1) (1− θ) pt
λ2
+ lim
T→∞
pt+T
1
Rˆt ..Rˆt+T−1
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In the stationary equilibrium, pt = p∗3, Rˆ
∗
3 > 1, limT→∞ p
∗
3
1(
Rˆ∗3
)T = 0
pF = p∗3
∞∑
τ=0
Rˆ∗3 − 1(
Rˆ∗3
)τ = p∗3
A.2 Model Extension
A.2.1 Investor’s Problem
The Lagrangian function is
L = ln ctt + β ln ctt+1
+λ1
[
(1− τ) ytt + p
r
t h Rt+1 − c
t
t − a
t
t+1 − pt h
t
t+1
]
+λ2
[
τ (1+ n) yt+1t+1 + Rt+1a
t
t+1 + pt+1h
t
t+1 − δr pt+1h
R
t+1 − c
t
t+1
]
+µ1
[
att+1 + (1− θ) pt h
t
t+1
]
+µ2
[
htt+1 − h
R
t+1
]
+ν1htt+1
+ν2h Rt+1
The FOCs become
ctt :
1
ctt
− λ1 = 0
ctt+1 :
β
ctt+1
− λ2 = 0
att+1 : −λ1 + λ2 Rt+1 + µ1 = 0
htt+1 : −λ1 pt + λ2 pt+1 + µ1 (1− θ) pt + µ2 + ν1 = 0
h Rt+1 : λ1 p
r
t − λ2δr pt+1 − µ2 + ν2 = 0
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where
µ1 ≥ 0, if att+1 + (1− θ) pt h
t
t+1 > 0, then µ1 = 0
µ2 ≥ 0, if htt+1 − h
R
t+1 > 0, then µ2 = 0
ν1 ≥ 0, if htt+1 > 0, then ν1 = 0
ν2 ≥ 0, if h Rt+1 > 0, then ν2 = 0
The life-time budget constraint for the investors is
ctt+
ctt+1
Rt+1
= (1− τ ) ytt+
τ (1+ n) yt+1t+1
Rt+1
+
(
pt+1
Rt+1
− pt
)
htt+1+
(
prt −
δr pt+1
Rt+1
)
h Rt+1
1. att+1 + (1− θ) pt h
t
t+1 > 0, h
t
t+1 − h
R
t+1 > 0, h
t
t+1 > 0, h
R
t+1 > 0, Then
µ1 = µ2 = ν1 = ν2 = 0. Plug them into the FOCs
−λ1 + λ2 Rt+1 = 0
−λ1 pt + λ2 pt+1 = 0
λ1 prt − λ2δr pt+1 = 0
The following equality holds
Rt+1 =
pt+1
pt
=
δr pt+1
prt
=
(1− δr ) pt+1
pt − prt
and the optimal consumption rules are
ctt =
1
1+ β
[
1− τ +
τ (1+ n) (1+ g)
Rt+1
]
ytt
ctt+1 =
βRt+1
1+ β
[
1− τ +
τ (1+ n) (1+ g)
Rt+1
]
ytt
and the private IOUs, housing assets, and rental housing are jointly deter-
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mined by
att+1 + pt h
t
t+1 − p
r
t h Rt+1 = (1− τ) y
t
t − c
t
t
Note that
δr pt+1
prt
= Rt+1 =
pt+1
pt
=
(1− δr ) pt+1
pt − prt
Then
Rt+1 =
pt+1 − (1− θ) Rt+1 pt
θ pt
=
(1− δr ) pt+1 − Rt+1 (1− θ) pt
θ pt − prt
2. att+1 + (1− θ) pt h
t
t+1 > 0, h
t
t+1 − h
R
t+1 > 0, h
t
t+1 > 0, h
R
t+1 = 0, then
µ1 = µ2 = ν1 = 0, ν2 ≥ 0. Plug them into the FOCs,
−λ1 + λ2 Rt+1 = 0
−λ1 pt + λ2 pt+1 = 0
λ1 prt − λ2δr pt+1 + ν2 = 0
Hence,
Rt+1 =
pt+1
pt
≤
δr pt+1
prt
(a) If µ1 = µ2 = ν1 = ν2 = 0, then we go back to the Case 1.
(b) If µ1 = µ2 = ν1 = 0, ν2 > 0, then
δr pt+1
prt
> Rt+1 =
pt+1
pt
>
pt+1 (1− δr )
pt − prt
and
att+1 + pt h
t
t+1 = (1− τ) y
t
t − c
t
t
Under this case, it is also true that
Rt+1 =
pt+1 − (1− θ) Rt+1 pt
θ pt
>
(1− δr ) pt+1 − Rt+1 (1− θ) pt
θ pt − prt
54
3. att+1 + (1− θ) pt h
t
t+1 > 0, h
t
t+1 − h
R
t+1 = 0, h
t
t+1 > 0, h
R
t+1 > 0, then
µ1 = ν1 = ν2 = 0, µ2 ≥ 0. Plug them into the FOCs,
−λ1 + λ2 Rt+1 = 0
−λ1 pt + λ2 pt+1 + µ2 = 0
λ1 prt − λ2δr pt+1 − µ2 = 0
Hence,
Rt+1 ≥
pt+1
pt
Rt+1 ≥
δr pt+1
prt
Rt+1 =
pt+1 (1− δr )
pt − prt
(a) If µ1 = µ2 = ν1 = ν2 = 0, then we go back to the Case 1.
(b) If µ1 = ν1 = ν2 = 0, µ2 > 0, then
Rt+1 =
pt+1 (1− δr )
pt − prt
>
pt+1
pt
>
δr pt+1
prt
and
att+1 +
(
pt − prt
)
htt+1 = (1− τ) y
t
t − c
t
t
h Rt+1 = h
t
t+1
In this case, it is also true that
Rt+1 =
(1− δr ) pt+1 − Rt+1 (1− θ) pt
θ pt − prt
>
pt+1 − (1− θ) Rt+1 pt
θ pt
4. att+1 + (1− θ) pt h
t
t+1 > 0, h
t
t+1 = h
R
t+1 = 0, then µ1 = 0, µ2 ≥ 0, ν1 ≥
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0, ν2 ≥ 0. Plug them into the FOCs,
−λ1 + λ2 Rt+1 = 0
−λ1 pt + λ2 pt+1 + µ2 + ν1 = 0
λ1 prt − λ2δr pt+1 − µ2 + ν2 = 0
Hence,
Rt+1 ≥
pt+1
pt
Rt+1 ≥
(1− δr ) pt+1
pt − prt
(a) If µ1 = µ2 = ν1 = ν2 = 0, then we go back to Case 1
(b) If µ1 = µ2 = ν1 = 0, ν2 > 0, then we go back to Case 2
(c) If µ1 = ν1 = ν2 = 0, µ2 > 0, then we go back to Case 3
(d) If µ1 = 0, µ2 + ν1 > 0, ν1 + ν2 > 0, then Rt+1 > pt+1pt and Rt+1 >
(1−δr )pt+1
pt−prt
.
att+1 = (1− τ) y
t
t − c
t
t
h Rt+1 = h
t
t+1 = 0
It is also true that
Rt+1 >
(1− δr ) pt+1 − Rt+1 (1− θ) pt
θ pt − prt
Rt+1 >
pt+1 − (1− θ) Rt+1 pt
θ pt
5. att+1 + (1− θ) pt h
t
t+1 = 0, h
t
t+1 − h
R
t+1 > 0, h
t
t+1 > 0, h
R
t+1 > 0, then
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µ1 ≥ 0, µ2 = ν1 = ν2 = 0. Plug them into the FOCs,
−λ1 + λ2 Rt+1 + µ1 = 0
−λ1 pt + λ2 pt+1 + µ1 (1− θ) pt = 0
λ1 prt − λ2δr pt+1 = 0
Hence,
λ1
λ2
≥ Rt+1
λ1
λ2
≥
pt+1
pt
λ1
λ2
=
δr pt+1
prt
Discussion:
(a) If µ1 = µ2 = ν1 = ν2 = 0, then we go back to Case 1.
(b) If µ1 > 0, µ2 = ν1 = ν2 = 0, then
λ1
λ2
=
pt+1 − (1− θ) Rt+1 pt
θ pt
Use the equation λ1λ2 =
δr pt+1
prt
then we have an expression for Rt+1
Rt+1 =
pt+1
pt − θ
δr pt+1
prt
1− θ
<
pt+1
pt
It follows that
Rt+1,
pt+1 (1− δr )
pt − prt
<
pt+1
pt
<
λ1
λ2
=
pt+1 − (1− θ) Rt+1 pt
θ pt
=
δr pt+1
prt
First of all, this suggests that the borrowing cost is smaller than the
intertemporal rate of substitution Therefore, the investors must be bor-
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rowing constrained. Secondly, the investors are indifferent between
constrained-borrow-to-empty and constrained-borrow-to-rent, i.e.,
pt+1 − (1− θ) Rt+1 pt
θ pt
=
(1− δr ) pt+1 − (1− θ) Rt+1 pt
θ pt − prt
Let x ≡
(
pt htt+1 −
prt
θ h
R
t+1
)
and γ t ≡ λ1λ2 =
pt+1−(1−θ)Rt+1 pt
θ pt . Rewrite
the budget constraints as
ctt + θ pt htt+1 = (1− τ) yt + p
r
t h Rt+1
ctt+1 = τ (1+ n) (1+ g) y
t
t +
(
pt htt+1 −
prt
θ
h Rt+1
)
θγ t
Then
ctt = (1− τ) y
t
t − θx
ctt+1 = τ (1+ n) (1+ g) y
t
t + θγ t x
Solve for x
x =
βγ t (1− τ) ytt − τ (1+ n) (1+ g) ytt
θγ t (β + 1)
Therefore
ctt =
1
1+ β
[
1− τ +
τ (1+ n) (1+ g)
γ t
]
ytt
ctt+1 =
βγ t
1+ β
[
1− τ +
τ (1+ n) (1+ g)
γ t
]
ytt
att+1 = − (1− θ) pt h
t
t+1
pt htt+1 −
prt h Rt+1
θ
=
βγ t (1− τ)− τ (1+ n) (1+ g)
θγ t (β + 1)
ytt
6. att+1 + (1− θ) pt h
t
t+1 = 0, h
t
t+1 − h
R
t+1 > 0, h
t
t+1 > 0, h
R
t+1 = 0, then
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µ1, ν2 ≥ 0, µ2 = ν1 = 0. Plug them into the FOCs,
−λ1 + λ2 Rt+1 + µ1 = 0
−λ1 pt + λ2 pt+1 + µ1 (1− θ) pt = 0
λ1 prt − λ2δr pt+1 + ν2 = 0
Hence
λ1
λ2
≥ Rt+1
λ1
λ2
≥
pt+1
pt
λ1
λ2
≤
δr pt+1
prt
(a) If µ1 = µ2 = ν1 = ν2 = 0, then we go back to Case 1
(b) If µ1 > 0, µ2 = ν1 = ν2 = 0, then we go back to Case 5
(c) If µ1 = µ2 = ν1 = 0, ν2 > 0, then we go back to Case 2
(d) If µ1 > 0, ν2 > 0, µ2 = ν1 = 0, then
λ1
λ2
=
pt+1 − (1− θ) Rt+1 pt
θ pt
Use the condition that λ1
λ2
<
δr pt+1
prt
, and the following inequality for
Rt+1 holds
Rt+1 >
pt+1
pt − θ
δr pt+1
prt
1− θ
It turns out that pt+1−(1−θ)Rt+1 ptθ pt >
pt+1
pt implies
pt+1
pt > Rt+1. There-
fore, It follows that
Rt+1,
pt+1 (1− δr )
pt − prt
<
pt+1
pt
<
λ1
λ2
=
pt+1 − (1− θ) Rt+1 pt
θ pt
<
δr pt+1
prt
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First of all, this suggests that the borrowing cost is smaller than the
intertemporal rate of substitution Therefore, the investors must be bor-
rowing constrained. Secondly, the investors prefer the constrained-
borrow-to-empty to the constrained-borrow-to-rent, i.e.,
pt+1 − (1− θ) Rt+1 pt
θ pt
>
(1− δr ) pt+1 − (1− θ) Rt+1 pt
θ pt − prt
Let x ≡ pt htt+1 and γ t ≡
λ1
λ2
=
pt+1−(1−θ)Rt+1 pt
θ pt . Use the fact that
ctt = (1− τ ) y
t
t − θ pt htt+1
ctt+1 = τ (1+ n) (1+ g) y
t
t − Rt+1 (1− θ) pt htt+1 + pt+1h
t
t+1
Then
ctt = (1− τ) y
t
t − θx
ctt+1 = τ (1+ n) (1+ g) y
t
t + θγ t x
Solve for x
x =
βγ t (1− τ)− τ (1+ n) (1+ g)
θγ t (β + 1)
ytt
Therefore
ctt =
1
1+ β
[
1− τ +
τ (1+ n) (1+ g)
γ t
]
ytt
ctt+1 =
βγ t
1+ β
[
(1− τ)+
τ (1+ n) (1+ g)
γ t
]
ytt
att+1 = − (1− θ) pt h
t
t+1
pt htt+1 =
βγ t (1− τ)− τ (1+ n) (1+ g)
θγ t (β + 1)
ytt
h Rt+1 = 0
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7. att+1 + (1− θ) pt h
t
t+1 = 0, i.e., the borrowing constraint of the investors is
binding
htt+1 − h
R
t+1 = 0, i.e., the investors rent all the houses out
htt+1 > 0, h
R
t+1 > 0, i.e., the investors hold positive amount of housing
Therefore, µ1, µ2 ≥ 0, ν1 = ν2 = 0. Plug them into the FOCs,
−λ1 + λ2 Rt+1 + µ1 = 0
−λ1 pt + λ2 pt+1 + µ1 (1− θ) pt + µ2 = 0
λ1 prt − λ2δr pt+1 − µ2 = 0
Hence,
λ1
λ2
≥ Rt+1
λ1
λ2
≥
pt+1
pt
λ1
λ2
≥
δr pt+1
prt
Use the fact that
−λ1 pt + λ2 pt+1 + (λ1 − λ2 Rt+1) (1− θ) pt + µ2 = 0
λ1 prt − λ2δr pt+1 − µ2 = 0
Solve for λ1λ2
λ1
λ2
=
(1− δr ) pt+1 − Rt+1 (1− θ) pt
θ pt − prt
(a) If µ1 = 0, µ2 = 0, ν1 = ν2 = 0, then we go back to Case 1.
(b) If µ1 > 0, µ2 = 0, ν1 = ν2 = 0, then we go back to Case 5.
(c) If µ1 = 0, µ2 > 0, ν1 = ν2 = 0, then we go back to Case 3.
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(d) If µ1 > 0, µ2 > 0, ν1 = ν2 = 0, then we have
λ1
λ2
> Rt+1
λ1
λ2
>
pt+1
pt
λ1
λ2
>
δr pt+1
prt
Use the expression λ1λ2 =
(1−δr )pt+1−Rt+1(1−θ)pt
θ pt−prt
, the above three in-
equalities implies
Rt+1 <
(1− δr ) pt+1
pt − prt
Rt+1 <
pt+1
pt − θ
δr pt+1
prt
1− θ
where I use the assumption θ pt − prt > 0. Therefore
(1− δr ) pt+1 − Rt+1 (1− θ) pt
θ pt − prt
=
λ1
λ2
>
δr pt+1
prt
,
pt+1
pt
, Rt+1
It is also true that
λ1
λ2
>
pt+1 − Rt+1 (1− θ) pt
θ pt
λ1
λ2
>
pt+1 (1− δr )
pt − prt
Recall that
ctt = (1− τ) y
t
t + p
r
t h Rt+1 − θ pt h
t
t+1
ctt+1 = (1+ n) (1+ g) y
t
t + Rt+1a
t
t+1 + pt+1h
t
t+1 − δr pt+1h
R
t+1
Let x ≡
(
pt −
prt
θ
)
htt+1, γ t ≡
λ1
λ2
=
(1−δr )
pt+1
pt
−Rt+1(1−θ)
θ−
prt
pt
. Then the
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above budget constraint becomes
ctt = (1− τ ) y
t
t − θx
ctt+1 = (1+ n) (1+ g) y
t
t + θγ t x
Solve for x
x =
βγ t (1− τ) ytt − τ t+1ytt+1
θγ t (β + 1)
Therefore
(
pt −
prt
θ
)
htt+1 =
βγ t (1− τ) ytt − (1+ n) (1+ g) ytt
θγ t (β + 1)
htt+1 = h
R
t+1
ctt =
1
1+ β
[
1− τ +
τ (1+ n) (1+ g)
γ t
]
ytt
ctt+1 =
βγ t
1+ β
[
1− τ +
τ (1+ n) (1+ g)
γ t
]
ytt
8. att+1 + (1− θ) pt h
t
t+1 = 0, h
t
t+1 − h
R
t+1 = 0, h
t
t+1 = h
R
t+1 = 0, then
µ1, µ2, v1, v2 ≥ 0.
ctt = (1− τ) y
t
t
ctt+1 = τ (1+ n) (1+ g) y
t
t
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A.2.2 Homeowner’s Problem
The Lagrangian function is
L = ln ctt + β (1− ζ ) ln ctt+1 + βζ ln
(
hrt+1 + h
t
t+1
)
+λ1
[
(1− τ) ytt − p
r
t hrt+1 − pt h
t
t+1 − c
t
t − a
t
t+1
]
+λ2
[
τ (1+ n) (1+ g) yt + Rt+1att+1 + pt+1h
t
t+1 − c
t
t+1
]
+µ1
[
att+1 + (1− θ) pt h
t
t+1
]
+ν1htt+1
+ν2hrt+1
The FOCs become
ctt :
1
ctt
− λ1 = 0
ctt+1 :
β (1− ζ )
ctt+1
− λ2 = 0
att+1 : −λ1 + λ2 Rt+1 + µ1 = 0
htt+1 :
βζ
hrt+1 + h
t
t+1
− λ1 pt + λ2 pt+1 + µ1 (1− θ) pt + ν1 = 0
hrt+1 :
βζ
hrt+1 + h
t
t+1
− λ1 prt + ν2 = 0
where
µ1 ≥ 0, if att+1 + (1− θ) pt h
t
t+1 > 0, then µ1 = 0
ν1 ≥ 0, if htt+1 > 0, then ν1 = 0
ν2 ≥ 0, if hrt+1 > 0, then ν2 = 0
and the life-time budget constraint is given by
ctt +
ctt+1
Rt+1
+ prt hrt+1 +
(
pt −
pt+1
Rt+1
)
htt+1 = (1− τ) y
t
t +
τ (1+ n) (1+ g) ytt
Rt+1
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1. att+1 + (1− θ) pt h
t
t+1 > 0, h
t
t+1 > 0, h
r
t+1 > 0, then µ1 = ν1 = ν2 = 0
−λ1 + λ2 Rt+1 = 0
βζ
hrt+1 + h
t
t+1
− λ1 pt + λ2 pt+1 = 0
βζ
hrt+1 + h
t
t+1
− λ1 prt = 0
Hence,
λ1
λ2
= Rt+1 =
pt+1
pt − prt
=
pt+1 − (1− θ) Rt+1 pt
θ pt − prt
The optimal decision rules are
ctt =
1
1+ β
[
1− τ +
τ (1+ n) (1+ g)
Rt+1
]
ytt
ctt+1 =
β (1− ζ ) Rt+1
1+ β
[
1− τ +
τ (1+ n) (1+ g)
Rt+1
]
ytt
hrt+1 + h
t
t+1 =
βζ
prt
ctt(
pt − prt
)
htt+1 + a
t
t+1 = (1− τ) y
t
t − (1+ βζ ) c
t
t
2. att+1 + (1− θ) pt h
t
t+1 > 0, h
t
t+1 > 0, h
r
t+1 = 0, then µ1 = ν1 = 0, ν2 ≥
0.Ifµ1 = ν1 = ν2 = 0, then we go back to Case 1. Ifµ1 = ν1 = 0, ν2 > 0,
−λ1 + λ2 Rt+1 = 0
βζ
htt+1
− λ1 pt + λ2 pt+1 = 0
βζ
htt+1
− λ1 prt + ν2 = 0
Hence
λ1
λ2
= Rt+1 <
pt+1
pt − prt
<
pt+1 − (1− θ) Rt+1 pt
θ pt − prt
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This suggests that if the rental price is high enough, i.e., prt > pt −
pt+1
Rt+1 ,
unconstrained workers will choose to own houses. The optimal policy rules
are
ctt =
1
1+ β
[
1− τ +
τ (1+ n) (1+ g)
Rt+1
]
ytt
ctt+1 =
β (1− ζ ) Rt+1
1+ β
[
1− τ +
τ (1+ n) (1+ g)
Rt+1
]
ytt
htt+1 =
βζ
pt − pt+1Rt+1
ctt
att+1 = (1− τ) y
t
t −
(1+ βζ ) pt − pt+1Rt+1
pt − pt+1Rt+1
ctt
3. att+1+(1− θ) pt h
t
t+1 > 0, h
t
t+1 = 0, h
r
t+1 > 0, then µ1 = 0, ν1 ≥ 0, ν2 =
0.If µ1 = ν1 = ν2 = 0, then we go back to Case 1. If µ1 = ν2 = 0, ν1 > 0
−λ1 + λ2 Rt+1 = 0
βζ
hrt+1 + h
t
t+1
− λ1 pt + λ2 pt+1 + ν1 = 0
βζ
hrt+1 + h
t
t+1
− λ1 prt = 0
Hence
λ1
λ2
= Rt+1 >
pt+1
pt − prt
>
pt+1 − (1− θ) Rt+1 pt
θ pt − prt
The optimal policy rules are
ctt =
1
1+ β
[
1− τ +
τ (1+ n) (1+ g)
Rt+1
]
ytt
ctt+1 =
β
1+ β
[
1− τ +
τ (1+ n) (1+ g)
Rt+1
]
ytt
prt hrt+1 =
βζ
1+ β
[
1− τ +
τ (1+ n) (1+ g)
Rt+1
]
ytt
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4. att+1 + (1− θ) pt h
t
t+1 = 0, h
t
t+1 > 0, h
r
t+1 > 0, then µ1 ≥ 0, ν1 = ν2 =
0.If µ1 = ν1 = ν2 = 0, then we go back to Case 1. If µ1 > 0, ν1 =
0, ν2 = 0
−λ1 + λ2 Rt+1 + µ1 = 0
βζ
hrt+1 + h
t
t+1
− λ1 pt + λ2 pt+1 + µ1 (1− θ) pt = 0
βζ
hrt+1 + h
t
t+1
− λ1 prt = 0
Hence, the condition for Rt+1 is
Rt+1 <
pt+1
pt − prt
<
λ1
λ2
=
pt+1 − (1− θ) Rt+1 pt
θ pt − prt
Because
ctt = (1− τ) y
t
t − θ pt htt+1 + p
r
t htt+1 − p
r
t
(
htt+1 + h
r
t+1
)
ctt+1 = τ (1+ n) (1+ g) y
t
t + (pt+1 − Rt+1 (1− θ) pt ) htt+1
Then we have
1+ βζ = λ1 (1− τ) ytt − λ1htt+1
(
θ pt − prt
)
and
β (1− ζ ) = λ2τ (1+ n) (1+ g) ytt + λ2 (pt+1 − Rt+1 (1− θ) pt ) htt+1
Combine the above two equations and let λ1
λ2
≡ γ t , then we have
(1+ β) ctt =
τ (1+ n) (1+ g) ytt
γ t
+ (1− τ) ytt
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If we know γ t , then we can express ctt , ctt+1, h
t
t+1 in terms of γ t
1+ β =
(1− τ ) ytt
(1− τ) ytt − θ pt htt+1 − p
r
t hrt+1
+β (1− ζ )
τ (1+ n) (1+ g) ytt
τ (1+ n) (1+ g) ytt + (pt+1 − Rt+1 (1− θ) pt ) htt+1
Use 1+βζ
(1−τ )ytt−(θ pt−prt )htt+1
= λ1 =
1
ctt
, the above equation can be simplified
into
1+ β =
(1− τ ) (1+ βζ ) ytt
(1− τ) ytt −
(
θ pt − prt
)
htt+1
+β (1− ζ )
τ (1+ n) (1+ g) ytt
τ (1+ n) (1+ g) ytt + (pt+1 − Rt+1 (1− θ) pt ) htt+1
This is a quadratic equation for pt htt+1. Let
x = pt htt+1
θˆ = θ −
prt
pt
ϕ =
pt+1
pt
− (1− θ) Rt+1
a = (1− τ) ytt
b = τ (1+ n) (1+ g) ytt
1+ β =
(1+ βζ ) a
a − θˆx
+
β (1− ζ ) b
b + ϕx
with one solution is zero, the other solution is
x =
aϕβ (1− ζ )− bθˆ (1+ βζ )
θˆϕ (1+ β)
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We can still define γ t
γ t =
λ1
λ2
=
ctt+1
β (1− ζ ) ctt
=
(b + ϕx) (1+ βζ )
β (1− ζ )
(
a − θˆx
)
=
ϕ
θˆ
=
pt+1 − (1− θ) Rt+1 pt
θ pt − prt
which gives
ctt =
1
1+ β
[
1− τ +
τ (1+ n) (1+ g)
γ t
]
ytt
ctt+1 =
β (1− ζ ) γ t
1+ β
[
1− τ +
τ (1+ n) (1+ g)
γ t
]
ytt
pt htt+1 =
pt
θ pt − prt
[
(1− τ) ytt − (1+ βζ) c
t
t
]
hrt+1 =
(1− τ) ytt − θ pt htt+1 − c
t
t
prt
att+1 = − (1− θ) pt h
t
t+1
5. att+1+(1− θ) pt h
t
t+1 = 0, h
t
t+1 > 0, h
r
t+1 = 0, then µ1 ≥ 0, ν1 = 0, ν2 ≥
0.If µ1 = ν1 = ν2 = 0, then we go back to Case 1. If µ1 = 0, ν1 = 0, ν2 >
0, then we go back to Case 2. If µ1 > 0, ν1 = 0, ν2 = 0, then we go back
to Case 4. If µ1 > 0, ν1 = 0, ν2 > 0, then the solution is the same as the
benchmark model without rental market.
6. att+1 + (1− θ) pt h
t
t+1 = 0, h
t
t+1 = 0, h
r
t+1 > 0, then µ1 ≥ 0, ν1 ≥
0, ν2 = 0. If µ1 = ν1 = ν2 = 0, then we go back to Case 1. If µ1 >
0, ν1 = 0, ν2 = 0, then we go back to Case 4. If µ1 = 0, ν1 > 0, ν2 = 0,
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then we go back to Case 3. If µ1 > 0, ν1 > 0, ν2 = 0, then
−λ1 + λ2 Rt+1 + µ1 = 0
βζ
hrt+1
− λ1 pt + λ2 pt+1 + µ1 (1− θ) pt + ν1 = 0
βζ
hrt+1
− λ1 prt = 0
Either
λ1
λ2
> Rt+1 >
pt+1
pt
>
pt+1 − (1− θ) Rt+1 pt
θ pt − prt
or
λ1
λ2
>
pt+1 − (1− θ) Rt+1 pt
θ pt − prt
>
pt+1
pt
> Rt+1
att+1 = 0
htt+1 = 0
ctt+1 = τ (1+ n) (1+ g) y
t
t
ctt =
1
1+ βζ
(1− τ) ytt
prt hrt+1 =
βζ
1+ βζ
(1− τ) ytt
A.2.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Suppose homeowners is not borrowing constrained. The Focs of homeowners
become
−λ1 + λ2 Rt+1 = 0
βζ
hrt+1 + h
t
t+1
− λ1 pt + λ2 pt+1 + v1 = 0
βζ
hrt+1 + h
t
t+1
− λ1 prt + ν2 = 0
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Suppose hrt+1 > 0, then v2 = 0,
λ1 prt − λ1 pt + λ2 pt+1 + v1 = 0
Therefore
Rt+1 =
λ1
λ2
=
pt+1 + v1λ1
pt − prt
≥
pt+1
pt − prt
>
pt+1 (1− δr )
pt − prt
This suggests that investors would not hold housing assets because the return of
investment in housing assets is strictly less than the return on consumption loans.
Hence, hrt+1 = 0 if homeowners are borrowing constrained. This is a contradic-
tion. Therefore, hrt+1 = 0 if homeowners are unconstrained.
A.2.4 Proof of Proposition 5
Since our point of interest is to see whether frictional rental market can resolve the
problem of vacant houses and prevent the rise of bubbles, I assume θ > θ L = ω,
such that there exists a bubble after the pension reform when δr = 0. From Lemma
10, we know that investors will hold housing assets only if homeowners are bor-
rowing constrained. Therefore, I only consider the equilibrium where homeown-
ers are borrowing constrained and investors lend to homeowners.
When there is a housing bubble, R∗ = 1. For the investors to be indifferent
between holding empty houses and renting them out, it must be pr = δr p. For
the homeowners to rent positive amount of housing, the necessary condition is
R∗ <
p
p − pr
<
λ1
λ2
= γ =
θ
θ − δr
which is obviously satisfied when R∗ = 1. The demand function for rental hous-
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ing is given by
pr hr = y − c − θ ph
=
β
1+ β
y −
θ
θ − δr
β (1− ζ )
1+ β
y
If δr ≥ θζ , then pr hr < 0. Homeowners demand zero rental housing if the rental
market friction δr ≥ θζ .
Housing bubble can still exist even with active rental market. The loan supply
is given by
∫
a I dµi = (1− ω)
(
1−
1
1+ β
)
y + pr
∫
h Rdµi − p
∫
h I dµi
where
h I ≥ h R
Let’s suppose h I = h R + h B, where h B is the amount of vacant houses.
∫
a I dµi = (1− ω)
β
1+ β
y +
(
pr − p
) ∫
h Rdµi − p
∫
h Bdµi
The loan demand function can be written as
∫
aH dµi = −ω
1− θ
θ − δr
β (1− ζ )
1+ β
y
The loan market clearing condition requires that
∫
a I dµi +
∫
aH dµi = 0
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Hence
p
∫
h Bdµi
= (1− ω)
β
1+ β
y −
(
p − pr
) ∫
h Rdµi − ω
1− θ
θ − δr
β (1− ζ )
1+ β
y
= (1− ω)
β
1+ β
y − ω
p − pr
pr
(
β
1+ β
y −
θ
θ − δr
β (1− ζ )
1+ β
y
)
− ω
1− θ
θ − δr
β (1− ζ )
1+ β
y
=
β
1+ β
y
(
1−
ωζ
δr
)
where the second equality comes from the market clearing condition for rental
market,
∫
h Rdµi =
∫
hr dµi . If δr > ωζ, then p
∫
h Bdµi > 0, i.e., there are
empty housing held by investors even through the rental market is active.
A.2.5 Proof of Proposition 6
Rt+1 = 1+ αK α−1t (At L t )
1−α − δ
In the equilibrium, if Rt+1 ≡ (1+ n) (1+ g), then
Kt
At L t
=
(
n + g + δ
α
) 1
α−1
We know that this is the lowest equilibrium interest rate. Hence, Kt+1 =(
n+g+δ
α
) 1
α−1 At+1L t+1 is maximum asset demand the production sector can ab-
sorb. If there exists bubble in the equilibrium, the the following condition holds
At (1− ω) L t
β
1+ β
(
Kt
At L t
)α
> AtωL t
1− θ
θ
β
1+ β
(
Kt
At L t
)α
+ Kt+1
Because Kt+1 = KtAt L t At+1L t+1, the above condition can be simplified as
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(1− ω)
β
1+ β
n + g + δ
α
> ω
1− θ
θ
β
1+ β
n + g + δ
α
+ 1+ n + g
which implies
1− ω
ω
>
1− θ
θ
+
1+ n + g
ω
1+ β
β
α
n + g + δ
and
1
θ
<
1
ω
(
1−
1+ β
β
α (1+ n + g)
n + g + δ
)
Hence
θ > ω
1
1− α 1+ββ
n+g+1
n+g+δ
A.2.6 Proof of Proposition 7
When τ = 0, the total supply of loan by investors becomes (1− ω) β1+β y. The
total loan demand from constrained homeowners becomes ω 1−θθ
β
β+1 y. Note that
both the supply and demand does not depend on interest rate. Therefore, bubble
will arise iff
(1− ω)
β
1+ β
y > ω
1− θ
θ
β
β + 1
y
which is equivalent to θ > θ L = ω. Therefore, if the economy stays at the case 1
of stationary equilibrium in Proposition 6, where both investors and homeowners
are unconstrained, then the removal of pension system will not trigger a bubble
equilibrium. If the economy stays at case 2 of stationary equilibrium in Proposi-
tion 6, we have
p2 H
y
=
1− ω
1− θ
[
1− τ −
1
1+ β
(
1− τ +
τ
R2
)]
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In the bubble equilibrium, the housing wealth/GDP ratio is β1+β . If τ >
θ−ω
1−ω , then
p2 H
y
<
(1− ω) (1− τ)
1− θ
β
1+ β
<
β
1+ β
A.2.7 Proof of Proposition 8
We know that households are constrained and investor hold housing assets close
to the neighborhood of new stationary equilibrium. From the financial market
constraint, we can show that
Kt+1 = (1− ω) L ta It+1 + ωL ta
H
t+1
Because
a It+1 + pt h
I
t+1 =
β
1+ β
wt
aHt+1 = − (1− θ) pt h
H
t+1
Plug them to the expression for Kt+1, we have
Kt+1 = (1− ω) L t
β
1+ β
wt − (1− θ) pt h Ht+1ωL t
= (1− ω) L t
β
1+ β
wt − (1− ω) L t pt h It+1 − pt h
H
t+1ωL t + θ pt h
H
t+1ωL t
= (1− ω) L t
β
1+ β
wt + θ pt ht+1ωL t − pt H
= (1− ω) L t
β
1+ β
wt + ωL t
β
1+ β
wt − pt H
Hence
pt H + Kt+1 = L t
β
1+ β
wt
Because
wt = (1− α) At K αt (At L t )
−α L t
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Figure 10: Phase Diagram for the Transitional Dynamics after the Pension Reform
then
p˜t H + k˜t+1 (1+ n + g) =
β
1+ β
(1− α) k˜αt
where pt = p˜t At L t , Kt+1 = k˜t+1 At+1L t+1.
When investor hold housing assets, we know that pt+1/pt = Rt+1, or equiv-
alently,
p˜t+1
p˜t
=
(
1+ αk˜α−1t+1 − δ
)
/ (1+ n + g)
Therefore, those two equations determine a autonomous system of
(
p˜t , k˜t
)
with
p˜t > 0 and k˜t > 0. The phase diagram is shown by figure 10. Note that p˜t = 0
cannot be a stationary equilibrium price because households will demand infinite
amount.
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